Demographics and the foreign indebtedness of the United States by John K. Hill
No. 9002
DEMOGRAPHICS AND THE FOREIGN




Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org) No. 9002
DEIIOGRAPHICS  AND TEE POREICN
INDEBTEDNESS  OF TUE I'NITED  STATES
John K.  H111*
January  19  90
:tsenior  Economist  and  Pollcy  Advisor,  Federal  Reserve  Bank of  Dallas.  The
views  expressed  in  thls  article  are  solely  those  of  the  author  and  should  not
be  attributed  to  the  Federal  Resetve  Bank of  DaIIas  or  to  the  Federal  Reserve
Svstem.DEMOGRAPHICS  AND THE FOREIGN  INDEB?EDNESS  OF THE I'NITED  STATES
TtIe net  foreign  investnent  posltlon  of  the  United  States  deteriorated
sharply  during  the  1980s.  According  to  Commerce  Departnent  estinates,  U.S.
net  foreign  assets  (which  include  stocks,  bonds,  and dLrect  ownershlp  of  land
and physical  capital)  fell  frorn  an  average  of  4  percent  of  GNP  during  the
1970s  to  -11  percent  of  GNP  by  1988.1  T'lxe  United  States  had been  a  debtor
country  throughout  the  l-9th  century,  as  foreign  investors  were  lured  by  the
vast  undeveloped  natural  resource  lrealth  of  the  country.  I{hat  ls  unusual
about  the  recent  lndebtedness  of  the  nation  is  the  suddenness with  which  it
occurred  and  the  fact  that  the  traditional  circumstances  surrounding  an
inves tment  boon  did  not  appear  to  be  present.
The prirnary  source  of  the  rlse  ln  U.S.  forelgn  lndebtedness  was a
massi.ve inflow  of  forei.gn  capital.  The lnflow  colncided  with  rapid  growth  i.n
the  U.S.  federal  budget  deficit--hence,  the  irresistable  conclusion  that  the
budget  deficlt  was the  prinary  factor  behind  the  growlng  foreign  indebtedness
of  the  nation.  But  the  inporlance  of  the  budget  deficit  is  probably
owerstated  by  the  circunstantial  evidence.  First,  it  is  likely  that  sone
individuals-  -faced  wlth  the  prospecr  of  higher  future  tax  liabilities,  either
for  themselwes  or  thelr  children-  -nade provlsion  by  saving  more out  of  their
lncone  than  they  otherwlse  would  have.  Any private  offset  to  public  dissaving
would  have  reduced  the  need  for  foreign  capital.  Second,  growth  in  the
federal  budget  deficit  was not  the  only  econouic  event  to  affect  world  capital
flows  during  this  period,  There  were  important  changes  in  laws  fegarding  the
ownership  of  foreign  assets,  especially  in  Japan.  By  the  nid  L980s,  the  world
capltal  uarket  was significantly  nore  lntegrated  than  it  had been  in  previous2
decades.2  Factors  that  tended  to  create  an  imbalance  between natlonal  saving
and domestic  lnvestnent  could  then  express  thenselves  in  the  forn  of
international  capltal  flows  rather  than  internatlonal  iriterest  rate
differentials.
The purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  evaluate  the  role  of  deuogtaphics  in  the
forelgn  indebtedness  of  the  United  states.  Specifically,  I  wish  to  determine
whether  differences  between  the  age uix  of  the  U.S.  population  and those  of
other  x0aj  or  lndustrialized  countries  are  in  the  right  dlrection  and  are  of
sufficient  nagnitude  to  explain  a  significant  anount  of  present  U.S.  foreign
indebtedness,  Of  their  own accord,  shifts  1n age distributl-on  are  too  gradual
to  produce  such  a  dranatic  movemenc  in  capital  as  occurred  during  the  1980s.
But  when coupled  with  a  deregulatlon  of  mafkets,  international  differences  in
age  structure  would  seem ln  principle  to  provlde  the  basis  for  a  large  and
sudden reallocatlon  of  world  capltal.
My analysls  of  deuographics  and U.S.  foreign  lndebtedness  is  based  on
sinulations  of  wealth  and capital  acctululation  in  the  United  States  and  three
other  major  industriallzed  countries:  Jspan,  l.Iest Ceroany,  and  the  United
Kingdon.3  In  the  nodel,  households  accr:mulate  lrealth  according  to  the  strict
life-cycle  theory.  They  inditectly  deternine  the  capital  stock  through  thelr
labor  supply  decisions.  The net  foreign  asset  position  of  a  country  is  given
by  the  difference  between  national  wealth  snd  the  domestic  capltal  stock.
Eecause indlvldual  wealth  and  labor  supply  vary  with  age,  a  nation's  net
forelgn  assets  vary  wlth  the  age distributlon  of  its  population.
In  a  counterfactual  exercise,  I  ask  what  the  equllibriun  allocation  of
world  capltal  would  have  looked  like  in  1980 had  there  been  a  free  flow  of
capital  between  the  najor  lndustrialized  countrLes.  The calculations  lndicateJ
that  dlfferences  in  age  nix  durlng  thls  period  were  sufficient  to  produce  a
deficit  in  U.S.  net  external  assets  in  an  anount  equal  to  8 percent  of  GNP.
The reason  for  this  result  is  straightforward.  Relatiwe  to  other  naj or
industrialized  countries,  the  United  States  had  a  young population.  Young
households  requlre  a  large  amounc of  capital  to  support  their  labor  supply,
yet  have  accuuulated  only  a  snall  amount  of  wealth.  Economies  with  young
populations  then  have  an  excess  denand  for  capital  and  become  debtors  in  the
lror1d  capital  narket.
In  the  paper  I  also  consider  what  projected  changes  in  age distribution
are  llkely  to  mean for  future  capital  flows.  If  the  world  interest  rate  is
held  constan!  at  its  1980 equilibriun  value,  shifts  !n  the  age nix  of  the  U.S.
poPulation  are  signlfLcant  enough to  raise  U.S.  net  capital  outfloss  frorn  -1
percent  of  GNP  during  the  nid  1980s  to  over  4 percent  of  GNP  by  the  year  2009.
The results  are  very  nuch  different,  however,  if  interest  rates  adjust  to
equalize  capltal  flows  within  the  four  countrles.  Because each  country  will
seek  to  export  capital  over  nost  of  the  next  two  decades,  interest  rates  must
fa1l  to  clea!  the  world  capltal  uarket.  The drop  in  interest  rates  reduces
each  country's  outflow.  Ttre United  States,  in  particular,  runs  a  current
account  deficit  throughout  the  1990s  and  on  into  the  next  century.
L  The uodel
My analysis  of  the  relatlonship  between  dernographlcs and U.S.  net
foreign  assets  is  based  on  simulations  of  agtregate  wealth  and capiEal
accumulation.  Ihe  purpose  of  the  sinulations  is  not  to  repllcate  or
accurately  forecast  the  U.S.  net  foreign  investnent  position,  but  to  gain  a
sense  of  the  degree  to  which  it  may be  influenced  by  denographics.  The nodel4
ls  extrenely  simple.  There  is  a  single,  nonperishable  conmodity  whlch  serves
as  both  a  consumption  good and a  capital  good and which  all  countries  produce
uslng  a  common  technology.  Households  have  the  sarne  preferences  for
consumption  over  time,  and  they  have  ldentical  patterns  of  labor  supply.
Differences  in  age  dlstribution  provide  the  only  basis  for  international
exchange .
A country's  net  external  assets  are  calculated  as  the  difference  between
lts  national  wealth  and  donestic  capital.  National  wealth  is  computed by
surnming  indiwidual  household  wealth.  Domestic  capital  is  deternined  by
strurning household  labor  supplies  and then  deducing  the  optioal  capital  stock
from  a  simple  rnodel of  production.
A.  Conputing  Household l.lealth
Households  are  formed  by  two  adults  of  age 21.  One of  the  adults  lives
through  the  age  of  75  and  the  other  through  the  age  of  80.  Ihus,  the  naxiurum
planning  horlzon  for  any household  is  60 years.  Households  accunulate  wealth
accordlng  to  the  life-cycle  theory.  Each household  maxinizes  a utility
function  of  the  forn
(1) E -  -p-r x  (1+6)1-iNi(cilNi)-e,
where  6  ls  a pure  rate  of  time  pfeference,  (1+p)-1  is  the  elasticity  of
lnterteuporal  substitution,  c,  ls  household  consumption  ln  period  i,  and Ni  is
effective  famlly  size  in  period  i.  Ttre rate  of  tine  preference  i.s  set  equal
to  .015.  In  choosing  a value  for  p,  I  follow  Robert  Hall  (1988)  who argues
that  the  elasticity  of  intertenporal  substitution  is  well  below  one and  is
probably  neer  zero.  I  assune  that  (1+p)-1  -  .3,The tine  path  of  effective  fanily  size  ls  derived  by  courbinlng  a  set  of
consurption  rreights  with  a  life-cycle  pattern  of  fanlly  size  and age
composltLon.  Ttre consumptlon  weights  are  chosen  to  be  consistent  with
eroplrlcal  studies  of  adult  equivalence  scales,a  To deflne  fanily  size  and age
conposition,  I  assume that  each household  follows  the  median  feftllty  pattern
of  wonen born  in  the  U.S.  baby  boon.s  The household  has  two  children.  The
first  is  born  when adult  nenbers  axe 27,  and the  second  ls  born  3 years  later.
The children  remaln  in  the  houe untll  they  are  2L.  This  fertlllty  pattern  i-s
used  only  to  determine  household  consumption  and wealth.  The stze  and age
distrlbution  of  each  country,s  population  are  based  on  actual  population  data
(see section  I.D).
The household  naximizes  utiLity  by  chooslng  a  tine  path  of  consunptlon
that  ts  financially  feaslble.  Assuming that  capital  markets  are  perfect  and
that  the  household  leaves  no bequests,  the  budget  constralnt  can be written  as
(2) 5  (l+r)r-ic,  -  (l+r)a,  + E  (l+r)1-rwlr,
where  r  is  che real  intexest  rate,  w is  the  real  arage fate,  l.  is  household
labor  supply  in  period  i,  and a1 is  wealth  at  the  beginning  of  the  planning
perlod,  Factor  prices  are  deternined  withLn  the  nodel  to  clear  the  world
capital  narket.s  The tiue  path  of  household  labor  supply  is  defined  to
reflect  age-related  variations  ln  both  labot-force  participation  and worker
productlvity  (see section  I.B).
An optinal  tine  path  of  consumption  ia  conputed  by  uaxlnl.zing  (1)
subject  to  (2).  t{ealch  ls  then  built  up  sequentially  as
at+1 -  al  + rrrr  +  ral  -  cr,Flgure  1  shows the  optl.nal  wealth  proflle  for  a  given  wage and  interest  rate.
The proflle  ls  "hunp-shaped, "  reflecting  a pattern  of  accumulation  during  the
working  years  followed  by  a  drawing  down of  wealth  durlng  retirement.  In  the
siuulations,  trouseholds  never  assuDe a negative  wealth  position.  T'tris is  not
because  of  any  li-quidlty  or  borrowing  constraint.  Rather,  given  the  tine  path
of  fanlly  needs,  it  ts  sinply  not  optir0al  for  the  household  to  i.ncur  debt.
The most  serious  linitatlon  of  the  life-cycle  nodel  is  that  it
overstates  the  rate  at  which  households  draw dowrr their  wealth  late  ln  life.7
By overstatlng  the  tate  of  dissaving  anong the  elderly,  the  nodel  w111 distort
the  path  of  net  external  assets  during  periods  of  significant  change  in  the
share  of  the  population  accounted  for  by  the  elderly.  For  the  United  States,
there  ls  li-ttle  movement in  this  part  of  the  age distribution  over  the  period
of  analysis.  Such is  not  the  case  for  other  OECD  countries,  especially  Japan
and lJest  Gernany,  As  I  will  note  later,  however,  the  direction  of  this  blas
is  clear,  and  lt  rel.nforces  the  concluslons  of  the  rnodel.
B.  Computing Required  Capital
Each country  produces  a  single,  nondepreciatlng  good using  labor  and  the
good itself  (capital).  The production  function  takes  the  Cobb-Douglas  forn,
and  it  is  assumed to  be  comon  across  countries  and constant  across  time.  The
optlnal  capital  stock  can  then  be  expressed  as
K -  la/ (L-a) | (w/r)L,
vhere  o  i.s  capital's  distributlve  share  and L  is  the  aggregate  labor  supply.
In  the  sinulations,  a  is  set  equal  to  .2.  When combined \tith  the  equlllbriun
interest  rate,  this  value  for  c  produces  a  capital/output  ratio  close  to  4.0'I
A11 types  of  labor  are  perfect  substitutes,  but  the  efficiency  of  an
i.ndlviduals's  labor  supply  warles  lrlth  his  age,  Ttrus,  aggregate  labor  supply
is  the  srrm  of  the  effectLwe  labor  supplles  of  individual  households.
Household  labor'supply  ln  perlod  i  is  glven  by
,r-piel+pief,
where  p!  and pf  are  the  labor-force  partlcipation  rates  of  the  rnale and
feuale,  and  gf  and  gf  are  the  ratlos  of  male  and  female  earnings  to  the
earnl-ngs  of  an  entry-level  male  worker.  The  g!  are  taken  frorn  an  age-earnlngs
equatlon  estimated  by  Finis  Welch  (1,979, Table  5,  p.  S85)  for  male  workers
wlth  1-3  years  of  college.  The term  gf  is  assuned to  be  independent  of  age
and  equal  to  1,.3  .
Labor-force  participation  varies  only  wl.th  age.  Ttte assumed pattern  of
nale  labor-force  partlclpatlon  is  consistent  wtth  cross-section  data  which
sholt  that  particlpatlon  for  nen begins  to  decllne  during  thelr  fifties  and
falls  off  sharply  durlng  their  nlddle  sixti.es.  The flgures  on  female  labor-
force  partlclpatlon  reflect  two  thlngs:  (1)  a basic  participation  rate  of  80
pefcent  for  women  who are  neither  in  their  childbearing  yeafs  nor  nearing
retirement  [as  proJ ected  by  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  (],984)  for  women
born  in  the  late  1940s and early  1950s1,  and  (2)  the  effect  of  young  children
on  female  labor  supply  las  estimated  by  II.  Bowen and T.A.  Finegan  (1959),  with
an  adjustnent  for  greater  use  of  day carel.s
Because scale  in  production  is  of  no  consequence,  each household
generates  a  demand for  capital  equal  to  s  fixed  proportion  of  its  labor
supply.  And because  household  labor  supply  varies  over  the  life  cycle,  so
does  the  househol-d's  capital  requlrement.  Figure  I  shows the  relationship8
between  age and requlred  capital  for  a  glven  wage and  interest  rale.  The
shape of  the  profile  during  the  first  half  of  the  llfe  of  the  household
reflects  the  effects  of  gains  i.n the  productivlty  of  the  male  worker  anc
changes  in  the  rate  of  fenale  labor-force  participation  during  the  chilo-
rearing  years.  Effective  household  labor  supply  peaks  when adults  are  in
their  early  forties.  At  thsc  polnt,  labor  supply  begins  to  decline--slow1y  at
first,  tracklng  the  decline  in  worker  productlvity,  and  then  rirore rapidily  as
labor-  force  participation  falls  off.
C.  A  Siurple  Explanation  of  How Denographics  Affect
a Country's  Net Foreign Asset  Positlon
By conparlng  the  wealth  profile  wlth  the  capital  profile,  we get  a  clear
Pieture  of  how the  age mix  of  a  country's  population  affects  its  net  external
asset  posltlon.  Young households  contribute  to  an excess  demand for  capital
because  the  capital  required  to  support  their  labor  supply  exceeds  their
personal  wealth.  Econonles  with  young populatlons  then  becone net  borrolrers
in  the  worl-d market.  As households  age,  thelr  sealth  increases  and eventually
cones  to  exceed  their  capital  requirenents.  At  that  point,  they  become net
suppllers  of  capital.  1'he aggregate  inplication  is  that  econonies  rrith  a
large  proportion  of  older  households  wilt  be net  international  creditors.
D.  Demographic Data
In  the  model,  households  are  assuued to  be  forued  by  two  lndlwlduals  of
age 2L.  The household  then  lives  for  a period  of  60 years  at  which  tine  the
the  last  adult  member dies.  Clearly,  nuch  denographic  detail  is  lost  in  this
rePresentation  of  the  household  life  cycle,  including  intergenerational  and
international  differences  in  life  expectancy,  age at  narriage,  and divorcerates.  But  the  nodel  does  allow  ne  to  recognlze  historleal  variations  in  the
size  of  successive  blrth  cohorts,
To  measure  the  number  of  households  forrned  in  a  given  country  in  year  t,
I  dlvlde  by  two  the  number  of  lndlviduals  who were  of  age  37  and  residing  in
the  country  during  year  (t+16).  Individuals  are  counted  in  their  late
thirtles  as  a  crude  adjustment  for  innlgration.  s  Population  projectlons  used
in  the  calculations  were  drawn  fron  the  folLowing  sources:  Gernany  (Federal
Republlc),  European  Connunity,  Office  for  Official  publieations;  Japan,
Instltute  of  Population  Problens  (1982);  United  Klngdom,  European Conmuniry,
offlce  for  Offlcial  Publlcations;  and  the  Unlted  States,  U.S.  Bureau  of  the
Census (  1984) .
II.  Denographics  and U.S.  Net  capltal,  Flores
durlng  the  1970s and  1980s
A.  Simulation  Results
Ttle deterioration  in  U.S.  net  foreign  assets  rras most  evldent  durlng  the
1980s.  Holtever,  glven  the  prevalence  of  capltal  controls,  pressure  for  the
United  States  to  inport  capital  nay  well  hawe been present  ln  earLler  years.
To  evaluate  the  role  of  dernographlcs  in  the  evolution  of  U,S.  foreign
indebtedness,  I  consider  an  intervening  peri.od--the  year  1980--and  ask  what
the  allocation  of  world  capital  would  have  looked  like  in  rhat  year  had
capltal  flows  been  unobstructed.  To sinplify  the  calculatlons,  I  assume that
the  factor  prices  that  clear  the  rdorld  capltal  narket  in  1980 also  prevailed
in  all  previous  years  and were  expected  to  prevaLl  in  all  future  years.
An equilibrlun  was determined  nunerically.  For  any partlcular  interest
rate,  there  is  a  unique  wage that  ensures  zero  economic proflts.  Given  these10
prices,  household  rsealth  can be  cornputed using  the  ll-fe-cycle  modeJ..
Aggregate  wealth  ls  then  the  srrn of  indivldual  household  wealth.  Given  factor
prices,  there  is  a  single  ratio  of  capltal  to  labor  that  ninimizes  costs  in
all  countries.  u{n aggregate  demand for  capital  can  then  be  conputed  by
nultiplying  this  ratlo  by  the  wortd  labor  supply.  Using  lterative  methods,  an
interest  rate  and  wage  can  be  for.rnd that  equate  aCEteEaXe wealth  at  the
beglnning  of  1980 to  the  world  capital  requirenent  for  that  year.
The market-clearing  interest  rate  proved  to  be  .05.10  At  that  inLerest
rate,  U.S.  net  forelgn  assets  r.ere -8 percent  of  (sinulated)  U.S.  GNP.  Table
1 provides  an  illustrative  sunmary of  the  calculations.  Because factor  prices
are  colllmon  across  countrles  and constant  over  t!ne,  the  wealth  position  of  any
household,  regardless  of  lts  nationality  or  vintage,  can be  deternined  from  a
single  age-wealth  proflle.  National  wealth  per  household  is  calculated  by
rnultiplying  wealth  at  each age by  the  fraction  of  the  household  populatlon  of
that  age and  then  suming  over  a1l  ages.  AgBregate  domestic  capital  per
household  Ls  conputed  in  a  sirnilar  way uslng  an  age-capital  profile.  Net
external  assets  per  household  are  a weighted  average  of  the  dlfference  between
household  wealth  and required  capltal  at  each  age.
The calculations  ln  Table  1  show clearly  how internatlonal  differences
in  age distribution  in  1980 were  sufficient  to  produce  a  substantial  deficit
in  the  U.S.  net  foreign  lnvestuent  position.  Relative  to  the  collective
populatlons  of  Japan,  Itest  Gernany,  and  the  United  Kingdon,  the  Unlted  States
had  a  large  proportion  of  households  in  the  age group  21-30  and a  srnall
proportion  in  the  group  aged 41-50.  Because the  gap between  required  capital
and personal  wealth  declines  steadily  wlth  age,  these  differences  Ln
population  age nix  yield  strong  predictlons  about  which  countrles  would  be  netlL
recipients  of  capltal  in  an efficient  market.  For  a broad  range  of  paraneter
values,  the  Unlted  States  proves  to  be  a  signlflcant  net  borrower  of
internatlonal  capital  11
Using  ttre  factor  prices  that  cleared  the  lnternational  capital  market  in
1980,  I  also  computed a hlryothetical  tlne  pach  of  changes  tn  the  stock  of  U.S.
net  foreign  assets  for  each year  fron  t-970-1989.  The calculated  flows  allow
us  to  gauge the  pressure  for  the  United  States  to  lnport  capital  during  the
1970s and  to  see how denographic  factors  nay hawe affected  U.S.  foreign
indebtedness  during  the  1980s.12  The results  are  shown ln  Table  2.
Denographic  forces  were  sufficient  to  produce  a  substantial  U.S.  currenL
account  deficit  throughout  both  decades.  The calculated  inflows  range  from  a
llttle  less  than  t  percent  of  U.S.  cNP tn  the  early  1970s, to  a high  of  2
Percent  of  GNP  durlng  the  early  1980s,  and then  back  down to  k  of  one percent
of  GNP  by  the  late  1980s.
The slnulated  movenents  ln  U,S.  foreign  indebtedness  can be  explained  in
terns  of  the  shiftlng  age mlx  of  the  U.S.  household  populatlon,  As  shown in
Flgure  2,  the  share  of  the  population  accounted  for  by  households  in  the  age
group  21-40  lncreased  stesdily  throughout  the  1970s and 1980s.  Ttris,  of
course,  reflected  the  entry  of  the  baby-boom generation  lnto  the  adulL
population.  Offsettlng  the  rise  in  the  frequency  of  young households  was a
decline  in  the  share  of  households  aged 41-50.  The  fall  ln  the  share  of  this
group  \{as associated,  ln  part,  wlth  the  aglng  of  the  baby-bust  generation  born
during  the  l-930s.  Because the  dlfference  required  capltal  and personal  wealth
is  larger  for  households  aged 21-40  than  it  is  for  households  aged 41.-60,
these  shlfts  in  age mi-x had  the  lnexorable  effect  of  raising  U.S.  foreign
indebtedness.12
To  further  understand  the  role  of  denographics  ln  the  buildup  of  U.S.
forelgn  liabilities,  it  is  useful  to  express  net  capital  outflows  as  the
difference  between  national  saving  ( change  ln  wealth)  and  donestic  investnent
(  change in  capital).'  The resul,ts  of  thls  deconposition  are  shown ln  Table  2.
Most  of  the  slmulated  uovenent  in  capital  inflows  during  the  1970s and  1980s
i.s  seen  to  be  the  result  of  changes  in  the  rate  of  domestic  investuent.  I,lhile
the  entry  of  the  baby  boon  into  the  adult  population  does  place  sone  do\,t {ard
pressure  on  the  aggregate  savings  rate,  its  x0ost lnportant  effect  ls  to  raise
the  rate  of  donestic  investnent.
B.  Ewaluating  the  Sinulations
How seriously  should  we  take  the  simulation  results?  One way  of  judging
them  is  by  the  reasonableness  of  the  nodel  from  which  they  are  deriwed.  The
principal  weakness  of  the  analysls  would  appear  to  involve  the  use  of  the
llfe-cycle  theory  as  a means of  descrlblng  household  savings  behawtor,  As  is
well  known,  the  life-cycle  lheory  substantlally  owerstates  the  rate  of  wealth
decumulation  durlng  retirement.  The sinulation  results  may then  be  distorted
if  there  are  significant  international  or  intertemporal  differences  ln  the
frequency  of  elderly  and  retired  individuals  ln  the  adult  population.  The
results  for  the  period  1970-1989  should  not  suffer  fron  this  distortion,
however,  as  they  are  driwen  by  differences  between  the  population  shares  of
the  young  or  niddle-aged,  not  the  eJ-derly.
Another  way  of  evaluating  the  simulations  is  to  conpare  the  calculated
movenents  in  each  of  the  model's  valiables  l'lth  actual  movenents  in  those
variables.  Figure  3  shows the  slnulated  and neasured  values  for  U.s.  net
capital  outflons  during  Lhe perlod  1970-1989,  Ttle sinulated  flows  do not13
natch  !re1l  with  rneasured flows.  There  were,  however,  faccors  other  than
deuography  that  had  an  lmportant  effect  on  capital  flows  durlng  this  period,
including  government  regulatlons  that  restricted  capital  outflows  from  Japan
and  other  najor'countrles  during  the  1970s and  rapid  growth  in  the  U.S.
federal  budget  deficit  during  the  1980s.  It  seens  clear  that  the  data  on
capltal  flows  could  easily  be  explained  by  a  confluence  of  different  forces,
wlth  denography  being  one  of  theu.
We can  also  break  dowrr capital  outflows  into  aggregate  saving  and
Lnvestnent  and  see how well  the  sinulated  novements  in  these  wariables  explain
their  actual  movements.  According  to  the  sinulations,  shifts  in  the  age nlx
of  the  U,S.  population  served  to  reduce  the  aggregate  saving  rate  during  the
1970s and  1980s,  but  not  by  very  much-  -something  on the  order  of  *  of  a
percentage  point  of  GNP.  Sinilar  results  hawe been  obtained  by  Lawrence
Summers  and Chris  Catroll  (1987).13  Measures of  actual  saving,  on  the  other
hand,  show  a  rnuch larger  decline  ln  the  private  sawings  rate-  -between  1k  and
2k  percentage  points.la  Demography cannot  account  for  this  nuch  of  a  decline
in  Prlvate  savlng.  If  other  factors  were  involved,  then  they  too  become part
of  the  explanatlon  for  the  rise  ln  U.S.  foreign  indebtedness.ls
Recent  trends  in  U.S.  denographlcs  should  also  have  had  an  important
effeet  on  the  rate  of  douestic  investment,  raising  it  by  perhaps  a  fult
Percentage  polnt  of  GNP during  the  1970s  and  then  reducing  lt  by  as  much 2
Percentage  polnts  of  GNP  during  the  l-980s.  Are  these  movements evident  ln  the
data?  Some  measures of  investment  fit  the  slmulation  scenario  very  well,  such
as  the  series  on  cycllcally-  adJ  usted  real  buslness  flxed  Lnvestment  reported
by  John  Taton  (1989,  Figure  5,  p.11").  Other  neasures,  however,  especlally
those  that  attenpt  to  adJust  for  econornlc depreciation,  indicate  that14
Lnvestnent  spending  trended  dormward  throughout  the  1970s  and  I-980s.16  Thus,
the  data  provide  no  clear  basis  for  evaluatlng  the  simulations.  It  does  seern
ltkely,  however,  that  the  rapid  growth  of  the  U.S,  labor  force  durlng  the
1970s and early  t980s  raised  the  rate  of  U.S.  capital  fornation.  Ttris  is  the
essentlal  uessage  of  the  sirnulations.
In  summary, denography  falls  well  short  of  offering  a  complete
explanation  for  the  recent  surge  in  U.S.  forelgn  lndebtedness.  Undoubtedly,
many factors  were  involved,  But  the  size  and robustness  of  the  simulation
results  glve  strong  indication  that  denography  played  an  lnportant  role.  By
inplication,  much of  the  recent  lndebtedness  of  the  Unlted  States  x0ay  simply
represent  an  intertemporal  exchange of  goods with  other  countrles  in  the
world.  To  that  extent,  future  living  standards  i.n the  United  States  have  not
been Jeopardized  as  greatly  as  the  raw  statistlcs  indicate.
III.  Projected  U.S,  Net  CapLral Floss,  1990-2009
Just  as  denographic  forces  were  slgnlficant  enough to  shape  the  pattern
of  international  investrnent  durlng  the  1.980s,  so  are  they  ll.kely  to  continue
to  affect  the  world  economy ln  coning  years.  In  this  section  I  conslder  what
future  denographle  changes will  nean  for  capital  flows  during  the  L990s and on
lnto  the  next  centurv.
A,. Constant  World  Interest  RaEe
I  begin  by  assuraing that  the  factor  prices  that  cleared  norld  markets  in
1980 rernain  constant  for  an  lndefinite  period.  Changes in  U.S.  net  foreign
assets  then  are  dri.wen solely  by  shifts  in  the  age nix  of  the  U.S.  populatlon,
Figure  4  shows projected  changes  in  the  age distribution  of  U,S.  households15
fron  1990 through  2009.  Ihe  most  notable  movenents  in  the  dlstribution  are
the  decllning  share  of  households  aged 2l-4O  and  the  rising  share  of
households  ln  the  age group  4)--60.  These movements, of  course,  are  associated
with  the  aging  of  the  baby-boon  generation.  Because the  gap between  required
caPital  and personal  wealth  declines  nlth  age,  the  shifts  in  age distribution
ix0ply  that  the  U.S.  economy will  have  a  diminished  need  for  foreign  capltal  in
future  years.
Shown in  Table  3  are  the  projected  values  for  U.S.  net  capltal  outflows,
natlonal  saving,  and  domestic  investment  over  the  period  1990-2009.  The
results  are  dranatlc.  As  the  population  ages,  savings  as  a  fraction  of  GNP
rlses  by  2 percentage  points.  Wlth  slolrer  grorrth  tn  the  labor  force,
investment  as  a  share  of  GNP  falls  by  roughly  3 percentage  polnts.  Both  the
rlse  in  savlng  and  the  decllne  in  investnent  work  toward  noving  the  Unlted
States  from  belng  a net  recipient  of  capital  to  being  a  net  supplier  of
capltal.  The size  of  the  swlng  is  enorrnous,  U.S.  capital  outfLo\rs  mowe frou
around  -1  percent  of  GNP  !n  the  early  1990s to  more than  4  percent  of  GNP  by
the  year  2009.  It  ls  inportant  to  keep  ln  nlnd,  howewer,  that  just  as  the
denographically-  induced  inflows  of  the  1980s  lrere  no  cause  for  alarn,  so  are
the  projected  outflows  no  cause  for  celebration.  T'he outflons  sinply  reflect
the  efforts  of  a  large  generati.on  preparing  fof  tts  retirement,
B.  Declinlng  World  Interest  Rate
ltle  projections  reported  in  Table  3 sere  based  on the  assumptlon  that
the  sorld  interest  rate  and wage renain  constant  at  thei.r  equilibrir.rn  values
in  1980.  During  the  decade of  the  eighties,  there  is  insufficient  mowement  in
the  age  nix  of  the  world  population  to  warrent  any  substantial  priceIO
adj ustnent.  Indeed,  the  percentage  discrepancy  between  world  rrealth  and  world
capital  demand ls  never  any  greater  than  1  percent,  and  by  1989  tt  is  nearly
zeto.  Over  the  next  two  decades,  however,  denographic  shlfts  withln  the
industrialized  .llorld  generate  a  growlng  excess  of  capital  supply  over  capital
deuand,  an excess  whlch  reaches  10 percent  of  world  wealth  by  the  year  2009.17
Interest  rates  need not  change if  new investnent  opportunlties  can be  located
outside  the  industrialized  world,  say  in  ftiird-World  or  newly- denocratized
countrles,  If  not,  rates  roust fall  to  clear  the  world  capital  x0arket.
Flgure  5  i.Ilustrates  how dlfferent  the  path  of  capital  flows  could  be
dependlng  on the  future  course  of  interest  rates.  Ihe  solid  lines  show
projected  net  capital  outflows  for  the  United  States  and  the  three  other  OECD
countrles  under  the  assumptlon  that  factor  prLces  remain  at  l-980 lewels.  In
the  absence  of  an  interest  rate  adjustnent,  each of  the  countries  tries  to  run
a  current  account  surplus  over  nost  of  the  twenty-year  period.  The dashed
llnes  ln  the  chart  show what  capital  flows  would  look  like  if  interest  rates
adjust  to  equalize  flows  uithln  the  industriallzed  world.18  By stinulating
donestic  investment,  the  drop  in  interest  rates  reduces  capltal  outflorrs  for
each  country.  T'he United  States,  in  particular,  continues  to  add  to  lts  stock
of  foreign  indebtedness  throughout  the  1990s  and  on  into  the  next  century.
IV,  Conclusions
In  thls  paper  I  have  conbined  detailed  denographic  infornatlon  wlth
conventional  economic nodels  of  wealth  and capital  accumulation  in  an  effort
to  determine  the  extent  to  which  denographic  conditions  in  the  lndustrialized
countrles  nay have  contributed  to  che recent  growth  in  U.S.  foreign
lndebtedness.  The results  indicate  that  denographic  forees  alone  were17
sufficient  to  generate  a  signlfl-cant  flow  of  foreign  capltal  to  the  unlted
States.  The sinulated  inflows  are  on  the  order  of  1  to  2 percent  of  GNP  per
year  for  rnost of  the  l-970s and  1980s.  For  the  sake  of  comparison,  peak
tnflows  during  this  peri.od  were  about  3 percent  of  GNP.  No single  factor  can
explain  the  grorrth  in  U.S.  foreign  indebtedness.  But  the  siuulation  results
are  sufficiently  strong  to  suggest  that  denography  played  an  inportant  role.
Shifts  in  the  age  structure  of  the  U.S.  populatlon  that  are  projected  to
occur  over  the  next  two  decades have  the  potential  to  raise  U.S.  net  capital
outflolts  by  as  nuch  as  5 percentage  points  of  GNP,  At  the  same time,  however,
demographic  conditions  ln  other  major  industrLalLzed  countrles  will  encourage
ttre  ir  export  of  capltal.  To avoid  a  savings  glut,  new i.nvestuent
opportunlties  may have  to  be  found  in  other  parts  of  the  world.  If  these
i.nvestments  are  not  forthconing,  the  United  States  is  likely  to  remain  a
debtor  country  for  uany  years  to  come.  More  lmportantly,  a  large  g,eneratlon
of  lts  citizens  may eafn  low  returns  on  its  wealth  and be  that  much less  well
prepared  for  o1d age  and retlrexlent.1R
Footnotes
I  Offi.cial  statistics  owerstate  U.S.  net  foreign  lndebtedness.  This
occurs  because  direct  Lnvestment  ls  valued  at  book  pri.ces  rather  than  narket
Prlces,  and U.S,  dtrec!  lnvestment  abroad  generally  predates  forelgn
ecquisition  of  U.S.  assets  (see Mlchael  Ulan  and Wlllism  Dewald (1989))
Desplte  the  error  in  official  measures,  it  is  r{ldely  agteed  that  the  United
States  ls  presentl"y  a  net  debtor  and  that  U.S.  foreign  indebtedness  ls  growing
at  a  rapi-d  pace.
2  Uslng  data  on  forward  excbange rates  and cowered  interest
dlfferentlals,  Jeffrey  Frankel  (1-989) flnds  evidence  of  substantlal  barriers
to  internatLonal  capital  flows  during  the  1970s.  A  liberalizatlon  of  capital
controls  by  Japan  and other  major  countries  during  the  late  1970s and  early
1980s,  however,  resulted  ln  a narrorcing  of  cowered  interest  differentials.
Frankel  concludes  that  the  deregulatlon  of  capltal  markets  was likely  to  have
been  an  lrportant  factor  behind  the  nasslve  flow  of  capitel  to  the  Unlted
States.  After  exaninlng  the  correlation  in  novements  in  consumpti.on spending
in  OECD  countrles,  Evan Koenig  (L989)  also  concludes  that  capital  markets  were
xnore i.ntegrated  in  the  1980s  than  they  had  been  in  the  previous  decade.  For
an htstorical  account  of  recent  changes  in  capital  controls,  see  Frankel  and
his  references.
3  Simulation  methods  have  also  been  used  by  Atan  Auerbach  and  Laurence
Kotlikoff  (1987)  in  their  study  of  the  effect  of  changes  in  fertility  rates  on
the  U,S.  social  security  systen,  A  slnilar  analysls  ls  carrled  out  by
Auerbach,  et  aI.  (1989)  for  the  United  States,  Japan,  West Gernany,  and
Sweden,  Sinulation  nethods  are  often  used  to  study  the  economlc  consequences19
of  denographic  changes because  aggregate  tix0e  series  data  do not  contaln
enough infornation  to  econometrically  identify  the  effects  of  gradual  shlfts
in  the  age  structure  of  a population  on nacroeconomic  aggregates.  An apparent
exceptlon  is  housing  prices,  which  Gregory  Mankiw and David  Weil  (l-989)  find
to  be  statistically  related  to  the  age nix  of  the  population.
a The consumption weights  by  age group are  as follows:  (0-5,  ,25),  (5-
15,  .33),  (f6-20,  .50),  (21-55, 1.0),  (> 65,  .75).  For a discussion of  rhe
estluation  and use  of  adult  equiwalence  scales,  see A.  Deaton  and J.
Muellbauer (1980, pp.  191-213).
s See Paul Glick  (1977) for  statlstics  on the  fertillty  patterns  of  U.S.
women  during  the  twentieth  century.
6 More precisely,  the  interest  rale  ls  adjusted  to  clear  the  capltal
narket.  The wage rate  is  deternined  along  a  factor-price  frontler  whlch
requlfes  that  profits  be  zero  in  a  competitive  equilibriuu.
7 A  low  rate  of  wealth  decumulation  can be  explained  either  by  longevity
and medical  risk  in  the  face  of  inperfect  annuity  markets  or  by  a  shift  ln
preferences  late  in  life  with  the  household  acquiring  nore  of  a  Easte  for
bequests.  The evidence  seens  to  favor  the  first  explanati.on.  The notive  to
transfer  wealth  at  death  does not  appear  strong.  The rate  of  decr:mulation
anong the  elderly  is  not  si.gnificantly  affected  by  the  presence  or  number of
chlldren,  and  estate  data  sholr that  bequeathed  wealth  is  shared  equally  by
children,  which  is  inconsistent  with  sone nodels  of  intergenerational
altruisn,
8 The participation  rates  by  age group  are  as  fo1lows.  For  the  nale:
(21-55, 1.0),  (56-60,  .85),  (61-65,  .70),  (> 55, 0).  For rhe fenale:  (2L-
26,  .8),  (27-34,  .6),  (3s-39,  .7),  (40-ss,  .8),  (56-60,  .55),  (51-5s,  .5),(>20
65, 0)  .
s  In  the  United  States,  for  example,  the  nuuber  of  residents  aged 2O-24
in  1970 was 3.5  percent  less  than  the  number aged 30-34  in  1980.
10 Being  dependent  on units  of  measurenent,  the  particular  solution  for
the  equillbrium  wage is  uninteresting.
11 A  sensltlvity  analysis  was conducted  by  varyLng  o  frorn  .1  to  .5,  6
from 0  to  .04,  and e  from  .2  to  .4.  The sinulated  walue of  U.S.  net  foreign
assets  in  1980 ranged  frorn  -3  percent  to  -16  percent  of  GNP.  T'lxe  ratio  of  net
foreign  assets  to  GNP  waried  directly  with  6  and  inversely  with  a  and c.
12 As  an alternative  case,  I  allowed  the  interest  rate  and wage to  adjust
to  clear  the  rrorld  capital  narket  in  each year  after  1980.  Llttle  price
adjustx0ent  was required,  howewer,  and  the  projected  path  of  U.S.  capital
outflows  was very  sinilar  to  the  one reported  in  Table  2,  As  I  indicate  in
section  III,  shifts  in  the  age rnlx of  the  world  population  do become
significant  during  the  1990s and early  2000s,  and  the  future  course  of  U.S,
lndebtedness  can be  slgnificantly  affected  by  dernographically  -  induced
movenents  in  interest  rates.
13 Sunmers and Carroll  calculate  the  effect  of  denographic  shlfts  on
aggregate  saving  by  conbining  age-specific  saving  rates  available  in  cross-
section  data  with  tlne  series  data  on  Ehe age distribution  of  income.
1a According  to  the  Conmerce Department,  U.S.  net  private  savlng  as  a
fraction  of  net  natlonal  product  fell  fron  an average  of  8.9  percent  during
the  1950s  to  an  average  of  6.3  percent  durlng  the  1980s.  Official  statistics
are  known to  suffer  fron  serious  meaauleuent  probleus,  howewer  [see,  for
exarnple,  the  article  by  Alan  Auerbach  (f985)1.  An alternatl.ve  measure by
Patrlc  Hendershoct  and Joe  Peek  (1987,  Table  4,  p.22),  which  adjusts  for  the2L
inflation  preniurn  in  investment  lncoue  and  the  savings  component  of  social
security  contributlons  and  expenditures  on  consuner  durables,  shoss  that  the
private  savings  rate  fell  by  only  lL  percentage  poLnts  over  the  period.
15 Michael'Boskin  and Lardrence Lau  (1988)  offer  one explanati.on  for  the
decline  ln  private  saving.  They flnd  that  lndivlduals  born  before  1939  (i.e.,
experienced  the  Great  Depression)  consume a  snaller  percentage  of  their  wealth
at  every  age  than  do  those  born  after  thern.  The  aglng  and  gradual  death  of
the  more thrifty  generation  serves  to  reduce  the  aggregate  saving  rate.  It  1s
unclear,  howewer,  whether  this  change ln  sawlngs  behawlor  represents  a  shift
tn  preferences  for  consumption  over  time  or  a  reduced  denand for  precautionary
saving.
15 For  a  discussion  of  the  recent  behavior  of  U.S.  investment  spending,
see John  Taton  (L989)  and Steven  Englander  and Charles  Steindel  (1989).
17 Ttre slze  of  the  surplus  is  probably  understated  in  my analysis.  For
sone oECD  countries,  e.g.  Japan  and lJest  Gernany,  the  shsre  of  the  elderly  is
projected  to  rise  si.gnificantly  throughout  the  1990s and  2000s.  ci.ven  that
the  simulation  model  overstates  the  rate  of  dissawing  anong the  elder1y,  the
potential  savings  overhang  is  likely  to  be  even  larger  than  my analysis
suggests.
18 In  the  calculations,  households  are  assuned to  be  nyopic  in  their
expectations  about  future  interest  rates  and wages.22
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NOTE: Data  are  based  on a  stylized  representation  of  household
formation  and dissolution.  See section  in  the  text  orl
denographic  data,a €l  El  Er  |!ll
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NoTE: Data  are  based  on a  styllzed  representation  of  household
formation  and  dissolution.  See section  in  the  text  on
demographic  data.Figure  5
Projected  Net  Capital  Flows  for  Selected  Industrialized













fJapan,  west  Gernany,  and  the  United  Kingdon,  colleccively.
Percent  of U.S.  GNP
Percent  ol U.S.  GNPTable  I
EQUILIBRIUM ALLOCATION  OF WORLD
HYPOTHETICAI  CALCUIAT]ONS  BASED
CAPITAL IN  ]-980:
ON COMPAXATIVE  DEMOGRAPHICS
United  States
NFA -  (.256)(-3.62)  + (.190)(-2.s7)  + (.141)(-I.35) + (.L52)(2.oi) +
.I19)  (2.78  ) -  -.084r (.  r42)  (6.18) + (
Other  Countries  +
NFA  -  (.194)(-3.62) + (.199)(-2.s7)  + (.180)(-1.36)  + (.1s8)  (2.o7)  +
(.  r32)  (2.78)  -  .082t (.137  )  (6.18) +
Key:  Net  foreign  assets  (NFA) are  calculated  as !  sr(ar-k1),  where si  is  the
share  of  the  population  accounted  for  by  households  in  age bracket  !,  a,
is  the  awerage veallh  of  a household  in  bracket  i,  and k,  is  Ehe average
capltal  required  to  support  the  labor  supply  of  a household  !n  bracket
i.  Age brackets  are  by  ten-year  age group,  beginning  wirh  2l-30  and
ending  r{ri  th  71-80.  Household wealth  and required  capital  are  expressed
as a percent  of  U.S.  GNP  per  household.
lDo  not  agree  because
+Japan,  I{est  Cerrnany,
of  a  srnall  difference  in  population  size.
and  the  Unlted  Kingdorn, collectively.Table  2
S  IMUIATED  Pd,TES
(Percent  of  GNP)
OF U.S.  SAVING, INVESTMENT,  AND CAPITAL OUTFLOW,  1970.1989
Natlonal












































































PROJECTED  RATES  OF U.S.  SAVING, INVESTUENT,  AND CAPITAL  OUTFLOW,  1990.2009
(Percent  of  cNP)
National
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